Changing Intergroup Boundaries in Brazilian Marriages: 1991 Marriages: -2008 The prevalence of marital homogamy provides insight into the social organization of group boundaries. For example, educational homogamy reflects the importance of social class (Schwartz and Mare 2005) , and racial homogamy is a key indicator of race relations (Qian and Lichter, 2007) . It follows that changing rates of intergroup marriage are indicative of shifts in the strength of social boundaries between groups. Marriage implies strong attachment in the most intimate of settings such that increasing intergroup marriage indicates a weakening of social barriers to interaction. The weakening of barriers may also extend to kin, friends and other social networks. Conversely, if social characteristics become more salient in interpersonal relationships, then rates of intermarriage will decline. In turn, increased visibility of couples in heterogeneous relationships can be a force for social change in the social acceptance of these types of relationships, and this change is further reinforced when new cohorts are reared in homes with greater degrees of homogeneity or heterogeneity.
Education, race, and religion form different contexts where people form relationships that could lead to marriage. Religious beliefs and behavioral codes shape preferences based on moral judgments and racial preferences are shaped by social constructions of race. Educational and religious institutions also provide a context where potential partners meet. Race affects marriage markets to the degree that neighborhoods, recreational activities and institutions such as education and religion are segregated. Thus, it follows that changes in the racial, religious, or educational context of a society would strongly influence rates of intermarriage. In fact, a large body of research documents multiple mechanisms through which religious, educational, and racial context influences intermarriage rates around the world (Goode 1970; Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991a Kalmijn , 1991b Kalmijn , 1998 Thornton 2005; Qian and Lichter 2007; Esteve and McCaa 2007; Fu and Heaton 2008; Rosenfeld 2008; Jacobson and Heaton 2008) . However, despite the extensive research showing that religion, education, and race each structure interpersonal interaction, the relative importance of these characteristics is not well understood. To date, some research has examined the joint distributions of marriage by education and race, but few have been able to study the joint distributions of all three. Further, none of these studies have examined changes in racial, educational, and religious assortative mating simultaneously.
The purpose of this research is to explore changes in the relative importance of religion, race and education in mate selection in a society undergoing dramatic changes in race relations, educational expansion, and religious diversity. More specifically, this research addresses four sets of questions about the nature of intergroup marriage in Brazil. Each set of questions involves both a description of the general tendency and the pattern of change. First, how does the overall likelihoods of homogamy compare across education, race and religion? Second, do subcategories of education, race and religion vary in the likelihood of homogamy? Third, are there specific patterns of heterogamy that are more common? Finally, is education associated with racial and religious homogamy? This paper addresses these questions by comparing national probability samples for the periods 1991 to 2000, and 2001 to 2008 . Answers to these questions will not only provide information about the relevance of these three characteristics in mate selection, but also give clues about how broad social change influences the formation of intimate relationships. Thus it offers a more comprehensive analysis of changing patterns of intermarriage by considering education, race, and religion.
Social Change and Intermarriage in the Brazilian Context
Theories of change in homogamy include changes in social structure that reduce the importance of ascribed vs. merited characteristics, changes in group sizes-either through government actions or through demographic processes, changes in values about the meaning and purpose of marriage , the large expansion of education, and changes in the operation of the marriage market (Treiman 1970; Mare 1991; Parsons and Platt 1970; Goode 1970; Thornton 2001 Thornton , 2005 Kalmijn 1991a Kalmijn , 1991b Kalmijn , 1998 Rosenfeld 2008; Qian and Lichter 2007) . A more general approach consolidates all of these social changes under the framework of modernization, or in the case of religion, secularization (Wilson 1976; Blau and Schwartz 1984; Smits, Utlee, and Lammers 1998; Rosenfeld 2008) . Assimilation theorists also note decline in the importance of ethnicity and religion in mate selection (Alba, 1981) . Inherent in the modernization perspective is the notion that fundamental shifts in the nature of intergroup relationships will occur (Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . In the case of mate selection, the perspective suggests that economic development, the expanding ideology of individual choice, and weakening of traditional social boundaries will lead to a shift in the relative importance of ascribed and achieved social characteristics (Kalmijn 1998 ). More specifically, as labor market opportunities become increasingly tied to human capital and less gender specific, and as educational opportunities expand, educational attainment will become more salient as an attractive characteristic in mate selection. In contrast, race will diminish in importance as a relevant attribute of potential partners. As religious tolerance increases and becomes more a matter of personal choice than of family and community tradition, it may also become less important in mate selection. However, as has been documented elsewhere, the modernization and secularization framework is often built on a flawed premise of universal and deterministic change, and regularly relies on the substitution of geographic variation for temporal variation, if not in practice, then often in theory (Raymo and Xie 2000; Thornton 2001; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003; Thornton 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . In fact, however, changes in endogamy appear to be path dependent, and frequently are subject to regional and cultural context (Halpin and Chan 2003; Raymo and Xie 2000; Smits, Utlee, and Lammers 2000; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003; Katrnák, Kreidl and Fonadova 2006) .
The Brazilian context is particularly interesting for the study of intermarriage because of its contrast to the primary locations of intermarriage research in the U.S. and Europe. One common problem for many locations is that they often do not have significant changes in education, religion and race (and especially all three simultaneously) over the period of observation, therefore making it difficult for researchers to examine trends in intermarriage in a context of social change. In contrast, even in just the last decades of the 20 th century, Brazil experienced striking social changes. Brazil has a unique history in terms of race relations, especially compared to the U.S., but it has also had interesting recent changes in race relations and racial diversity. As well, Brazil's current change from a largely Catholic nation to a more heterogeneous Christian nation is also well documented. There has also been a relatively large increase in the number of Brazilians with no religion. Finally, the improvements in education over the past two decades provide an intriguing backdrop from which to study educational homogamy. Although we only examine changes in endogamy and homogamy from 1991-2008, we acknowledge that social changes prior to this would have contributed the direction and size of any intermarriage change. Therefore, we are careful to discuss social changes in the last few decades of the 20 th century. In the paragraphs that follow we briefly outline some of the possible factors related to both the level of educational, racial and religious endogamy, and important social changes that may be related to transformations in educational, racial and religious endogamy from 1991-2008.
Education
Education in Brazil has historically been something only the elites could obtain. Over the past several decades, and particularly between 1970 and 2000, Brazil moved from a largely homogenous country of low education, to a country with a wide range of educational attainment (Esteve and McCaa 2007; Fígoli 2006; IBGE 2004 (Halpin and Chan 2003; Mare, 1991) . As the educational needs of the country expand, not only are preferences concerning other endogamous marriage factors (such as race and religion) expected to decline, but preferences for educational homogamy are generally expected to increase (Kalmijn 1991b; Kalmijn 1998) . Therefore, Brazil's attempt to improve education may have also increased people's preference for education in a marriage. Some informal sanctions by peers and family favoring higher education levels may have increased (Esteve and McCaa 2007) . As well, recent work suggests that education-induced delays in marriage restrict the marriage market (especially for college educated), thus increasing educational endogamy (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1991b; Blossfeld and Timm 2003) . For Brazil, as education has increased, college has replaced high school as the primary social class partition (Schwartzman 2007) . In sum, these changes point to an expected increase in educational homogamy.
Contrary to the above hypothesis, recent changes toward greater educational equality in
Brazil suggest that educational homogamy may decline. Inequality among educational groups is associated with greater educational endogamy (Fu and Heaton 2008) . As SES inequality increases, preferences for similar SES also increase. As well, SES group identification would increase and create stronger group sanctions against exogamy. Finally, increasing inequality also often means increasing segregation by class, thus constraining the marriage market. Over the last two decades of the last century, there was a rise in inequality and poverty through most of the 1 Although we only focus on educational homogamy, it is important to note that it correlates highly with other measures of SES homogamy (Mare 2000; Raymo and Xie 2000; Fu and Heaton 2008; Rosenfeld 2008 Of course, the expansion of education and the changes in inequality may influence educational homogamy in different ways across the educational distribution. As in other contexts, research in Brazil suggests that people tend to marry others of adjacent education levels (Schwartzman 2007) . This pattern often results in higher homogamy rates for those at the two ends of the education spectrum because both groups have only one direction of choice other than their own level of education (i.e. people with the highest level of education can only marry people with the same or lower levels of education, and people with the lowest education can only marry people with the same or higher levels of education) (Fu and Heaton 2008) . By comparison, there is often low educational endogamy for the middle education level because they have choices of spouses with both higher and lower adjacent levels of education (Esteve and McCaa 2007) . There is also evidence that while educational homogamy has remained steady over the last few decades for the lowest education group, it has increased for the college educated, and that heterogamy is more common than homogamy in the middle education level (Esteve and McCaa 2007) . Thus, while higher levels of education are seeing an increase in homogamy due to the role of education in delaying marriage and constraining the marriage market, lower levels of education may be experiencing an increase in educational intermarriage due to a decrease in inequality and a more educationally heterogeneous population (IBGE 2000; IBGE 2004 ).
Finally, it is important to note that the changes in education occurred across all levels of education and were experienced equally by men and women (Fígoli 2006; Esteve and McCaa 2007) . Typically, having similar educational distributions for men and women implies that hypergamy should decline (Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Sweeney and Cancian 2004) . As educational homogamy has declined, in its place female hypergamy has increased slightly, while female hypogamy has almost tripled in size (from about 10% of the population in 1970 to 30% in 2000) (Esteve and McCaa 2007) .
Race
The racial context of Brazil is complex (Bailey 2004; Sansone 2003 ) and continues to be contested (Bailey, 2008) . While still a Portuguese colony, over 4 million slaves from Africa were brought to work primarily in the Northeastern region. For much of this period, White men far out-numbered white women leading to high levels of miscengation between white men and nonwhite female slaves (Telles 1992 (Telles , 2004 . By the end of the 19 th century this resulted in a population largely made of mixed ancestry and a broad spectrum of skin colors. To this, the 20 th century added a large stream of Asian immigrants, causing Brazil to have even higher levels of population admixture. Also, through much of its history Brazilian culture has emphasized color of skin over racial identity, in part due to the complex racial ancestry of many Brazilians. Thus, even within one family, an observer may classify members of the family in two or more races or Brazil has never had formal sanctions against interracial marriage since the abolition of slavery in the late 1800's. This is not to imply that there is no racism, but rather, that racial identification, and thus racial preferences and group sanctions, may not be as strong as in other countries (Bailey 2004) . Because of this history, racial intermarriage is still common today-although marriages between blacks and browns are more common than between blacks and whites (and both are more common than black-white exogamy in the U.S.) (Degler 1986; Telles 2004 ).
Between 1980 and 2000, racial distribution in Brazil remained about the same, with blacks (preta) between 5-6%, browns (parda) 39-42% and whites (branca) 54-52% and less than 2% other (IBGE 2004) . Although the distribution of race has seen only minor changes, two important transformations in the racial context occurred at the end of the 20 th century. One change is that intermarriage appears to be more acceptable now than even two decades before (Telles 2004) . Brazilians appear to recognize racial problems, and most are in favor of affirmative action policies (Bailey 2004 ). Interestingly, Bailey (2004) also shows that favoring affirmative action is more strongly (negatively) correlated with education than it is with race. All of these changes in values and attitudes point to possible changes in the preferences and informal sanctions around interracial marriage. Some work in the U.S. shows that people whose attitudes become favorable towards interracial relationships positively correlate with having more interracial relationships (Fiebert, Karamol and Kasdan 2000) . Thus if the change in attitudes represents a reduction in racial endogamous preferences, or a reduction of informal sanctions against racial intermarriage, then we would expect to see racial endogamy decline. One important caveat to this change is that for some people, the movement since the 1990's to address remaining racial inequalities may have increased the salience of race as a social identity, thus possibly increasing racial endogamy among those people (Daniel, 2006; Telles, 2004) .
A second change in Brazil's racial context is that there has been a large migration from the predominately nonwhite Northern regions to the predominately white, economic center of the South and from the rural areas to the urban centers (IBGE 2000 (IBGE , 2004 (IBGE , 2007 Silva 1999) . To the extent this migration racially integrates the marriage market by reducing racially segregated peer networks and residential segregation, racial endogamy should decline ( 
Religion
The Brazilian religious context is also an interesting contrast for most locations of intermarriage research. Religious endogamy in Brazil has been historically high for several reasons. First, for most of Brazil's history, the population was almost entirely Roman Catholic. It wasn't until the 1970's that Roman Catholics were less than 95% of the population (IBGE 2004) .
Being Catholic has always been a strong social identifier, and many people claim to be strong Catholics even without attending frequently. Even the Afro-Brazilian religions contain strong Catholic components, with some people participating in both religions (Prandi 2000) . Second, the increase in Protestants over the last two decades, and especially since 1990, has dramatically changed the religious landscape of Brazil. Protestants (particularly the Pentecostal Protestants)
have consistently separated themselves from the rest of the Brazilian society, and have made it a point of honor to be in stark contrast to the rest of society (McKinnon, Potter and GarrardBurnett 2008; Chesnut 1997) . Typically, religious groups that are more independent of society will have higher rates of religious endogamy (Cavan 1970) . Third, sanctions against marrying outside of the Protestant faith are extremely high. And although not as strong, Catholic rhetoric is also negative toward religious intermarriage (Cavan 1970) . Thus, based on the strong third party role religion plays in Brazil, religious endogamy is expected to be very high.
Theories of change in religious intermarriage typically work from a model that assumes societies move toward being less religious, and more secular, causing religious institutions to have less regulation and influence over the lives of the population, leading to a decrease in religious homogamy (Wilson 1976, Blau and Schwartz 1984; Rosenfeld 2008 Clearly, the rise in the number of nonreligious has been remarkable, and it may suggest a decline in the importance of religious identity, and thus a possible decline in religious endogamy.
Other important changes in religious context also predict a decline in religious 
Interactions
To this point our discussion has been conducted as though race, religion and education were independent social identities and unique social changes, which is far from reality. For example, race and education in Brazil are highly correlated. That is, despite the emphasis on phenotype through skin color over racial ancestry, as Telles (2004) explains, race in Brazil is bidimensional. One dimension is the cultural or ideational views of race discussed above. The second dimension, however, is related to the immense inequality within Brazilian society that is highly correlated with skin color (Lam 1999; Silva and Hasenbalg 2000) . More specifically, whites run the entire spectrum of social class, blacks are primarily located in the lower class and browns are also located in the lower class-with a few also found in the middle class. This results in nonwhites having lower educational attainment, lower wealth and worse health than whites. It should also be noted that compared to whites, it is substantially harder for nonwhites to increase their SES over their lifetime (Halsenbalg and Silva 1988) .
Similarly, in Brazil, a prominent theme within race research is that "money whitens" (Schwartzman 2007) . For example, nonwhites marry whites at higher rates when they have higher SES (Silva 1987 , Telles 2004 ). This is due to the fact that more educated non-whites have few options but to marry well educated whites, but whites within that same education level, even at lower levels, have many possible white partners to choose from. As well, recent work by Status exchange is the most frequently examined concept regarding the interrelationship between homogamy or heterogamy across different social dimensions. The concept was applied to explain marriage between minority and majority groups. The hypothesis was that black men with higher socioeconomic status would exchange this socioeconomic status for higher racial caste when marrying white women (Merton 1941) . Recent research suggests that support of this hypothesis is weak and unreliable (Rosenfeld 2005) . Alternatively, there is support for the equal status exchange hypothesis that individuals in low status minority groups with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to marry a spouse with a similar level of socioeconomic status, often leading to out-marriage from their racial or ethnic group (Fu 2008) . We will consider the possibility of status exchange by examining the relationship between education and endogamy for each category of race and religion.
In sum, education, race and religion each shape individual preferences, include people in social contexts where norms about preferences are expressed, and provide social settings for interpersonal contact. Modernization theory implies that as achievement replaces ascription, religion and race will become less salient in interpersonal interaction as education becomes more central. More nuanced theories of social change question the evidence for and simplistic logic behind this prediction. Research comparing change in the relative importance of these characteristics in mate selection is rare. Brazil provides an interesting setting for examination of changing patterns of mate selection because racial boundaries have been fluid, religious diversity is increasing and educational attainment in increasing. This paper examines changes the relative strength of homogamy, comparing race, education and religion. In addition, we examine category specific patterns of homogamy and heterogamy, as well as interrelationships across each of these characteristics. homogamy. There is also a noticeable decline in homogamy for race groups, some religious groups, and the least educated. The patterns are influenced by the shifting marginal distributions.
Data and Methods

Data
Methods
Log-linear models are often used in the analysis of intermarriage. One of the major advantages of these models is that they take into account composition by including effects for the husband and wife characteristics in the census can be explained by the tendency for educational, racial and religious homogamy. Of the three, religious homogamy is the largest (see Table 5 for the coefficients). The parameter implies that couples are about 27 times more likely to marry someone of the same religion (e 3.283 = 26.66) than someone of a different religion once marginal distributions have been taken into account. Likewise, couples are 5.2 times more likely to marry someone of the same race and 3.6 times more likely to marry someone with the same education.
Each type of homogamy declined over the decade, but the parameter for change is quite small relative to the corresponding parameter for homogamy. For example the coefficient for change in racial homogamy indicates that the odds of a same race marriage are three-fourths as high in that educational homogamy increases as education becomes a more critical marker for males and females (Schwartz and Mare, 2005) .
Assuming that homogamy is uniform across groups may be an over-generalization. To test this, model 3 (in Table 4 ) includes a homogamy parameter for each category of race, education and religion, as well as a change parameter for each. With Census data, this model improves the overall fit, but only by about five percent. Parameters reported in Table 5 show the relative magnitudes of group specific homogamy. Racial homogamy is greatest for Blacks-a pattern that has been examined extensively in the United States. Whites also have high rates of homogamy. Not surprisingly, those with mixed ancestry (Brown) have much lower rates of homogamy. These patterns show some similarity to the United States where Blacks have the highest rates of homogamy, but the parameters are much smaller in Brazil (Jacobson and Heaton, 2008) indicating that the boundaries between groups are much more fluid in Brazil. Homogamy is declining for Whites and Blacks at the same pace, but is increasing slightly for Browns.
Educational homogamy is greatest at the extremes of the distribution, but relatively low for those with primary education. Homogamy is also increasing somewhat for couples at the two ends of the distribution, signaling increasing isolation for the least and most educated. In contrast, those with more primary education or a secondary education are experiencing lower rates of homogamy. This mixed pattern explains the overall lower rate of change in educational homogamy compared with race and religion.
Religious homogamy is highest among the Historical Protestants, followed by newer Protestant groups. Afro-Brazilian groups and those with no religious preference have somewhat lower rates of homogamy, and Catholics have the lowest rate. Homogamy is actually increasing within Historical Protestants and Afro-Brazilian groups, but declining in other groups. highest at the tails of the distribution and educational homogamy in the middle of the distribution is declining. The major differences is that the Census shows some decline in intermarriages between Brown husbands and wives, but the PNAD shows a decline in Brown homogamy that parallels declining homogamy for the other two groups.
Heterogamy
In this section, we consider patterns of out-marriage in more detail. Racial heterogamy is not considered because adding more parameters would over-fit the data (there are nine cells in the race cross-tabulation, and the model of group specific homogamy uses eight degrees of freedom). The most common pattern of educational heterogamy is to marry a partner who has similar education. This creates a marriage gradient such that greater similarity in education leads to a greater likelihood of marriage. Model 4 (in Table 4 ) adds a parameter for the absolute value in the difference in education and a parameter for change. This model noticeably improves the fit of the model. In the Census data, the parameter of the education gradient is large and suggests that the likelihood of marriage is reduced by about 70% for each step in educational difference (see Table 6 ). The parameter for change in the education gradient indicates that the gradient has moderated a little over the decade. The education gradient is somewhat smaller in the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] period, reflecting decline in importance during the earlier period, but the parameter for change is not statistically significant.
Hypergamy is the second most commonly discussed aspect of educational heterogamy.
More specifically, men tend to marry women who are less educated. We test for this by adding a dummy variable if the husband is more educated than the wife (results not shown). We also add a dummy variable for change in hypergamy. Adding these effects does not improve the model fit substantially in either Census or PNAD data. Parameters indicate a tendency for hypergamy, but this tendency has declined by half in each time period. If a similar decline where observed in the next decade, hypergamy would disappear.
With five religious groups, there are several possible patterns of religious intermarriage.
Preliminary analysis (not shown) identified 4 combinations with particularly high or low likelihoods of intermarriage. Effects for these combinations are estimated in Model 6 (in Table   4 ). The model yields a modest improvement in fit. Parameters indicate that there are higher than average propensities for intermarriage between Catholics and Afro-Brazilians, and between Catholics and those with no religion (see Table 6 ). The first type of intermarriage is not surprising because in Brazil it is common for people to be involved in both Catholicism and Afro-Brazilian rituals (Prandi 2000) . It thus appears that Catholicism may not be as exclusive as some other groups. This could be because Catholicism has been able to incorporate diverse groups and allow some flexibility in religious practice. In contrast, the other-Christian group tends to be more exclusive, particularly when it comes to marrying those with Afro-Brazilian identity or with no religious preference (Oro and Semán 2000) . Parameters for change indicate that each of the above noted tendencies toward or against intermarriage are weakening over time.
Status Exchange
We test for status exchange by including parameters for the interaction of education and group specific homogamy. Husband's and wife's education are considered in separate models because they are highly correlated (models 6 and 7 of Table 4 ). Inclusion of effects for the interaction between education and group specific homogamy yields only modest improvement in overall fit. Parameters for husband's and wife's education have the same sign, with one exception, and support similar conclusions (see Table 7 ). In the Census data, higher educational attainment increases the likelihood of homogamy for whites and blacks, but more educated brown men are more likely to marry someone of a different race. The educational effect on white homogamy is increasing over time, but the reverse is true for educational effects of black homogamy. There is an increasing tendency for more educated brown women to marry exagamously, while the educational effect for brown men is stable. In the PNAD, education increases the likelihood of White homogamy and decreases the likelihood of Brown homogamy as is the case in the census. Results for Blacks homogamy are inconsistent across the two data sets. Most of the parameters for change in the PNAD are not statistically significant. Relatively small coefficients and minimal increases in model fit suggest that status exchange is not a dominant feature of marriage patterns in Brazil.
Higher educational attainment increases the likelihood of religious exogamy for men and women in each religious group. Among men, the educational effect on exogamy is most evident among Historical Protestants, and among women the effect is comparatively large for Historical Protestants, Afro-Brazilians and those with no religious preference. The association between education and religious exogamy has weakened over time for all groups except Afro-Brazilians.
Conclusion
Data from the last two censuses of Brazil and from more recent rounds of the PNAD allow us to compare levels of and trends in racial, educational and religious mate selection.
Racial homogamy appears to be less pronounced in Brazil than in a variety of other cultural contexts. For example, Jacobson and Heaton (2008) Fu and Heaton (2008) . Consistent with prior research in Brazil and other contexts, educational homogamy is most pronounced at the lower and upper ends of the distribution. Religious homogamy is much more pronounced in Brazil than educational or racial homogamy. This difference is surprising given the attention than is generally focused on racial and educational homogamy, and suggests that more attention should be given to the role of religion in mate selection. Results suggest that the recent growth among non-Catholic groups is an important force shaping interpersonal interaction. Of course, some of the homogamy may appear because partners decide to belong to the same group. Even religious switching, however, signifies the importance of shared membership among married couples. Religion may play a greater role in day-today couple interaction than either social class or ethnicity. Although Catholics are somewhat less likely to marry endogamously, all groups considered here show strong tendencies toward in-group marriage.
In addition to homogamy, results of three other aspects of mate selection are also evident.
First, there is a strong educational gradient whereby partners who do not marry someone in the same educational category, still tend to marry a partner with only slightly lower or higher education. Second, people who marry out of their religion also show preference for or against marrying into other groups. In particular, there appears to be some compatibility between Catholics and Historical Protestants or Afro-Brazilians, and incompatibility between emerging evangelical groups and Afro-Brazilians and those who do not belong to a religious group. Third, contrary to the status exchange hypothesis, higher education appears to facilitate in marriage for whites and blacks, but education is associated with religious exogamy.
The most common pattern of social change is increased fluidity in mate selection.
Homogamy parameters are becoming smaller for race, education and religion, but the pattern of change is not uniform. Boundaries appear to be increasing at the two tails of the education distribution and for some religious categories. Parameters for the education gradient, for the most prominent types of religious inter-marriage, and for the effects of education on inter-racial and inter-religious marriage are also becoming smaller for the most part. These patterns are consistent with the modernization perspective predicting decline in the importance of ascribed characteristics, but not consistent with the prediction that achieved characteristics will become more important. Rather, they suggest an overall tendency toward more openness in mate selection, countered by increasing social boundaries at the tails of the education distribution and for some categories of religion.
A possible explanation for the declining rates of homogamy in all three areas (race, education and religion) is the expansion of beliefs in equality and freedom as inalienable rights.
Research documents substantial worldwide changes in beliefs about freedom and equality over the past 50 years (Cott 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Smith 1990; Thornton 2005; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003) . Arland Thornton (2001 Thornton ( , 2005 has argued that these values have had a particularly powerful influence in generating worldwide change in family behavior due to their perceived positive relationship with modernity.
This ideational change would manifest itself through two primary mechanisms. First, it would change people's preferences. That is, groups once perceived as unequal and thus unattractive for marriage, may become seen as equals, thus making their attractiveness higher as well. Second, a society increasing its belief that individuals are free to make their own choices reduces the strength of group sanctions, thus reducing endogamy. Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) similarly argue that rising levels of values supporting individual preferences over community/family preferences (in conjunction with increasing individual resources greater democracy) has generated greater individual choice. Assuming few people were constrained to marry heterogamously, an increase in individual choice would probably result in a decline heterogamy. Thus, the ideals of equality and freedom reduce the significance of race, religion and education boundaries, thereby promoting the observed decline in homogamy. 
